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Abstract
This essay is an opinionated exploration of the constraints that
modal discourse imposes on the theory of assertion. Primary
focus is on the question whether modal discourse challenges the
traditional view that all assertions have propositional content.
This question is tackled largely with reference to discourse
involving epistemic modals, although connections with other
flavors of modality are noted along the way.
My assignment for this handbook — to write about assertion and modal-
ity — presupposes that there is an interesting connection between these
two. That presupposition alone might, at first, seem surprising. We do
not expect there to be important connections between speech acts and
specific linguistic categories; this volume does not contain entries about,
say, assertion and pronouns. Why is modal language any different? The
answer I explore is that modality poses a distinctive, broad and relatively
unified set of challenges to the development of a theory of assertion.
The goal of this chapter is to acquire a clear view about the content and
scope of these challenges. Although we aim for a clear view, we will not
be able to do better than gaze down at the territory from 50,000 feet.
My discussion will be extremely light on technical details, on matters
of compositional implementation, and even on careful discussion of
data. (All those things are at the heart of the project of natural language
semantics, but there is no substitute for mastering the works surveyed
here.) The case at the center of the paper is epistemic modality, but I
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also note some important extensions and applications concerning other
flavors of modality.
1 Content skirmishes.
Stalnaker’s classic “Assertion” begins with three truisms about assertion.
The very first of these is that “assertions have content; an act of assertion
is, among other things, the expression of a proposition — something that
represents the world as being a certain way” (1978, p.78). Stalnaker’s
truism rings true of a great many assertions. Consider, first, assertions
performed by uttering ordinary factual sentences like:
(1) There is chocolate in the cupboard.
Say that C is the content of such an assertion (in context). It is reasonably
clear how C represents the world. Plausibly, representing the world is,
at least in part, a matter of distinguishing possibilities. So, C must
distinguish those possibilities that contain chocolate in the (contextually
relevant) cupboard from the rest. A successful assertion of C has the
effect of ruling out from consideration the latter set of possibilities.
Related to this representational function, contents like C have distinctive
cognitive and conative roles. One can have, and maintain, a degree of
credence in C—perhaps a numerical one, like .5. One can also hope that
C is true and prefer the scenario it represents to others.
A terminological break before we go any further: in the previous para-
graph, I stuck to the phrase assertion made by uttering sentence s. That
is my tribute to the standard ontology of assertions according to which
what speakers assert are propositions, not sentences. Sentences are vehi-
cles, not objects, of assertions. However, it will be convenient to abuse
terminology and speak as if we assert sentences.
The pattern illustrated by (1) holds for many assertions of non-epistemic
modal sentences. Consider:
(2) I can reach the chocolate in the cupboard.
By asserting (2), I represent the world as one in which I have the ability to
reach the chocolate in the cupboard.1 The same cognitive and conative
interaction pattern arises here as well: it makes sense to have, and
1My having that ability might itself be a modal property. See Mandelkern et al.
(2017) for an advanced proposal about the semantics of ability statements.
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maintain, a degree of belief in the content of (2). It also makes sense to
hope that one has the relevant ability, and to prefer that scenario to the
alternatives.
Now for one of the interesting cases: how do assertions involving unem-
bedded epistemic possibility modals represent the world? Consider:
(3) There might be chocolate in the cupboard.
What possibilities do I rule out by asserting (3)? This is not clear at all.
Surprisingly, it is not even clear that I necessarily rule out any possibil-
ities. In some cases, I mean to ensure that we keep some possibilities
relevant. In others, I mean to expand the range of possibilities we are
talking about, so as to include the possibility that chocolate is in the cup-
board. These do not seem to be effects we can easily recover if asserting
(3) is a matter of ruling out possibilities. The puzzlement seems even
sharper when we consider future-directed epistemic possibility claims,
like:
(4) The tax plan might hurt the economy.
What future outcomes would falsify (4)?
These epistemic possibility claims do not seem to have the cognitive and
conative roles we assigned to non-modal contents. It is quite difficult to
assign degrees of belief to the contents of (3) and (4).2 And it is hard to
see what sort of state of the world one hopes will result when one hopes
that P is epistemically possible.
To be clear: these disanalogies are itches, not arguments. They are rea-
sons to inquire into whether it makes sense to associate these sentences
with propositions. They also are reasons to go into this inquiry with an
open mind. But in the end, there may well be other explanations for
why the analogy between non-modal and epistemic modal sentences
is strained. I discuss proper challenges to propositionalist accounts of
epistemic modality in the next section.
There is a canonical answer to the questions about the truth-conditions
of (3) and (4). According to contextualists, (3) is true iff the contextually
relevant information is compatible with there being chocolate in the
cupboard (false, otherwise). Similarly, (4) is true iff the information
2With some effort, we can come with recherché contexts in which this is possible.
But the difficulty in producing these contexts and their rather sparse distribution is
already enough to sustain the point I am making here.
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that is salient in the context of utterance is compatible with the tax
plan’s hurting the economy. What makes these views contextualist is the
idea that ♦P (read: it might be that P) may have different truth-values
in different contexts, which in turn is due to the fact that ♦P expresses
different propositions in different contexts.3
We will consider more precise versions of contextualism in section 2.
For now, it will help our view of the territory if we fix some terminology.
Draw an initial distinction between propositions and contents. These
terms have lots of uses, but as I will use them here, propositions are
objects that, in Stalnaker’s words, represent the world as being a certain
way. Contents are whatever objects play the content role in our theory
of communication and intentionality. Given this distinction, Stalnaker’s
first truism consists of two separate claims: one, that assertions have
contents; two, that those contents are propositions. We will see some
views that endorse the first but not the second claim.
Contextualism is the most prominent way to bring epistemic modals
back in line with Stalnaker’s first truism, but it is not the only option.
Invariantist approaches have the same effect (Braun 2012). To have a
name for the broader class of approaches, say that a T is a propositional
theory of some sentences S if and only if T entails (i) that all of the Ss
are eligible vehicles of assertion and (ii) that all of the Ss express propo-
sitions. Contextualism and invariantism yield propositional accounts
of sentences involving unembedded epistemic modals, like (3) and (4).
Any view that rejects either (i) or (ii) is non-propositional.
Non-propositionalism about epistemic modal sentences is close to in-
compatible with Stalnaker’s first truism. After all, if the problematic
utterances of ♦P are assertions and the non-propositional diagnosis is
correct, some assertions do not express propositions. In fact, there are
two ways of going down this "assertions without propositions" path. One
is to accept that assertions must have content but deny that contents
must be propositions (in the strict sense in which I am using the world
proposition). I discuss this in section §4.3. The other way is to reject the
idea that all assertions must have content—whether propositional or of
a different kind. This sounds heretical but I am going to suggest(in §4.2)
it is a possible way of interpreting the framework of update semantics.
Before moving on, let me note that other kinds of modals generate
patterns that resemble what we saw with epistemic possibility claims.
Consider:
3MacFarlane (2011a, 2014) calls this indexical contextualism so as to distinguish it
from a non-indexical version of contextualism. That difference will not matter here.
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(5) There probably is chocolate.
(6) You may buy chocolate.
(7) You should donate to the local food depository.
(8) There should be chocolate in the cupboard.
The modals in (6)-(7) have a deontic flavor; the modal in (8) is sometimes
treated as epistemic modal (Cariani, 2013) but has been argued by
Yalcin (2016) to be a modal that tracks normality (I’m happy to go
along with Yalcin’s proposal). The relation between these modal claims
and epistemic possibility claims is that standard utterances of these
sentences do not seem well understood as ways of describing the world.
Yet, they also have some of the hallmarks of assertion.4
In the rest of the essay, I will call the class consisting of all these modal
claims the disputed class. This unifying terminology is a convenient
device to remind ourselves that some of the points we will make about
epistemic possibility have tight correlates with other kinds of claims. It
is not meant to signal that I think the arguments against propositional
accounts have equally strong correlates.
2 Challenges against propositionalism.
Propositionalists must explain what possibilities are ruled out by as-
sertions of unembedded epistemic modal sentences. As noted, contex-
tualists maintain that an assertion of (3)—there might be chocolate in
the cupboard—represents the world as one in which some contextually
salient state of information is compatible with there being chocolate in
the cupboard.
Different versions of contextualism vary in how they identify the relevant
information state. A simple but unpopular option is solipsistic contextu-
alism — the view that the salient information state is the speaker’s. Most
contextualists follow Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991, 2012) in allowing the
relevant information state to be some salient body of evidence, perhaps
the information that is collectively possessed by a relevant group.5
4To the list exemplified by (5)-(8), we might add indicative conditionals. The
literature on non-propositionalist theories of conditionals is a subject matter in its own
right. For two recent contributions that directly bear on the topic of the present essay,
see Stalnaker (2011) and Rothschild (2013).
5For variations on this theme, with different degrees of departure from Kratzer, see
DeRose (1991); Dowell (2011); von Fintel and Gillies (2011); Yanovich (2013); Stojnić
6 ASSERTION AND MODALITY
If standard contextualism about the disputed class of modal sentences
is right, there is no need to intervene on the theory of assertion. Indeed,
part of what it is for standard contextualism to be right is that whatever
general theory of assertion we accept for ordinary non-modal sentences,
should apply to assertions of sentences in the disputed class.6 This is
often touted as an advantage of the contextualist picture.
In this section, I provide a short review of some well-known challenges
against standard contextualism along with some of the most salient
replies. The main emphasis is on arguments that are at least in part
empirical. The literature also contains several discussions that are more
theoretical in character.7
2.1 Rejection.
One prominent argument against contextualism involves the correct
modeling of rejection (Egan et al. 2005, Stephenson 2007, MacFarlane
2011a, MacFarlane 2014, §10.1). Suppose that Stephanie utters (3) while
on the phone with me; unbewknownst to her, I am looking directly into
the relevant cupboard and I know, as well as I know anything else, that
it contains no chocolate. Then, the objection goes, it is legitimate for
me to reject Stephanie’s assertion. I might say: that’s wrong! there is
no chocolate! This kind rejection would not make sense had Stephanie
asserted I don’t know that there isn’t chocolate in the cupboard. If so,
solipsistic contextualism must be wrong. Moreover, if successful, this
argument should generalize to flexible versions of contextualism. As
long as the relevant body of information is fixed rigidly by the context
of utterance, and as long as it leaves open whether there is chocolate in
the cupboard, it should not be possible to reject it from a more informed
point of view.
“Eavesdropper” variations amplify this point: disagreeing with an epis-
temic modal claim from a more informed point of view appears to be
possible even for individuals who are clearly not salient in the context.
Imagine eavesdropping on a conversation between Stephanie and me.
(forthcoming).
6Stojnić (forthcoming) argues that this still leaves contextualists free to develop
rich and novel accounts of the interaction between context and content.
7Yalcin (2011) objects that contextualism gets the subject matter of epistemic
claims wrong (the subject matter of it might be raining is the weather, not some body of
information). Moss (2018, §2.2) defends her proposal that assertions have probabilistic
contents on the basis of different sort of high-level virtues. For example, she argues
that probabilistic contents help unify the "account of the communication of full beliefs
and probabilistic beliefs" (p. 27).
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The background, as usual, is that neither Stephanie nor I know whether
there is chocolate in the cupboard; she utters (3). Unbeknownst to us,
you are hidden under an invisibility cloak and staring directly into the
empty cupboards. You lift your invisibility cloak, and reject her utter-
ance by saying that’s wrong, there is no chocolate in those cupboards!. If it is
legitimate for eavesdroppers to reject an assertion in this way, contextu-
alists must include in the relevant body of information the information
of people who are not parties to the conversation. But that would make
it a mystery of why we take ourselves to be warranted in making these
assertions in the first place.
Arguments from rejection have been controversial. Dowell (2011) de-
fends standard contextualism by suggesting that these disagreement
cases are underdescribed. Expand one way, and the original utterance
doesn’t sound warranted; expand the other and the rejection won’t sound
great. Similarly, von Fintel and Gillies (2008) argue that the sort of re-
jection we saw in the previous paragraph is not always appropriate,
especially if there is a large time lag between the assertion and the rejec-
tion. One aspect of the picture of epistemic discourse these critics have
in mind can be illustrated with a nice quote from a popular book about
the psychology of prediction:
[...] the Harvard economic historian and popular commenta-
tor Niall Ferguson told an interviewer in January 2012 "The
Greek default may be a matter of days away". Was Ferguson
right? [...] let’s imagine that there was no default of any
kind. Could we say Ferguson was wrong? No. He only said
Greece "may" default and "may" is a hollow word. (Tetlock
and Gardner, 2015, p.59)
The authors’ main worry is the weakness and flexibility of epistemic
possibility claims (the quote is extracted from an impassioned plea
for replacing them with precise probabilistic language in prediction).
Speaking for myself, I don’t mind the slack of may. But the quote
also offers a clean and natural data point about rejection: Ferguson’s
prediction reads like a hedged claim; the use of may makes it really
unnatural to say he was wrong. We get an even stronger judgment of this
sort if we consider a slight variation on this case involving numerical
expressions of subjective uncertainty. Suppose that a counterfactual
version of Ferguson, call him Schwerguson, had said there is a 40%
chance that Greece will default by the end of the year. This presumably
entails what Ferguson actually said. So, if it’s appropriate to reject
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Ferguson’s claim, it should be appropriate to reject Schwerguson. And
yet, it is intuitively inappropriate, at year’s end, to say that Schwerguson
was wrong. If we were really serious, we might score Schwerguson’s
prediction with a numerical measure like the Brier score. But even if
Schwerguson doesn’t get a Brier-score gold star, we are not in a position
to reject his claim—certainly not by saying that he was wrong.
One of the most intriguing developments surrounding rejection-based
arguments against contextualism is the development of a small but
thriving experimental literature challenging some of these data. Knobe
and Yalcin (2014) find experimental evidence that the pattern of rejection
in these challenges is not one that people find plausible. Participants
in Knobe and Yalcin’s experiment are told that there is evidence for the
conclusion Fat Tony might be dead (for short dead). They are also told that
dead is false—Fat Tony is, in fact, alive. Knobe and Yalcin’s finding is that
participants who are given this assessment advantage overwhelmingly
judge dead to be false but mostly judge ♦(dead) to be true. (Their
task tested this in a somewhat indirect way: see their descriptions of
experiments 1 and 2 for the relevant details.) Knobe & Yalcin note
that the relativist should predict much higher endorsement rates for
the rejection judgment. In a recent paper, Khoo and Phillips (ms.)
have contested whether this experiment successfully undermines the
relativist position. Khoo and Phillips note that relativists do not have to
say that the body of information that matters in a context of assessment
is the assessor’s—they too could go flexible. Indeed, flexible relativism
is MacFarlane’s official position (see MacFarlane 2014, §10.4.4). Khoo
and Phillips run a more elaborate set of experiments that they interpret
as making trouble for both relativism and contextualism.8
2.2 Retraction.
Suppose again that Stephanie asserts (3) while in an information state
that is compatible with chocolate in the cupboards. Shortly thereafter,
she gets access to the cupboards. No chocolate in sight. In such a
case, the objection goes, it is legitimate for her to retract her assertion.
Reporting on her earlier utterance, Stephanie might say I was wrong. This
is a problem for the contextualism: after all, her original assertion was
warranted by her epistemic state at the time she made it. If her assertion
was warranted, the permissibility of her retraction is not expected under
8For other recent experimental investigations of modal disagreement and rejection
(sometimes beyond the epistemic domain), see Khoo (2015); Khoo and Knobe (2016).
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any version of contextualism.
As in the case of rejection, these retraction arguments have been the
object of criticism. In particular, von Fintel and Gillies (2008) deny Mac-
Farlane’s data concerning the permissibility of taking back utterances
by saying I was wrong. Indeed, resisting the rejection arguments should
naturally lead to resisting these retraction data as well, since retracting
by uttering I was wrong is a way for a future self to reject an assertion by
an earlier self.
In addition, Knobe and Yalcin’s (2014) experimental studies also tested
judgments about retraction. Participants in their retraction experiment
were given an extended version of the Fat Tony story. In this extended
version, the inquiring agent finds out the falsehood of P and retracts the
original assertion by saying I was wrong. Participants in the experiment
tended to agree with this self-assessment in the non-modal case (i.e.
when the speaker had said Fat Tony is dead, but it turns out he isn’t) but
were evenly split in the modal case.
In my view, this is a node in the dialectic in which thinking in a more in-
tuitive way about retraction offers a better view of the anti-contextualist
point. One of main points of retracting assertions is to stop others from
relying on them. This can be accomplished without having the speaker
declare that they were wrong: they might just say I take that back or I
take back what I said. Consider this case: on Monday I tell my roommate
that he might have failed his chemistry class. On Tuesday, my room-
mate makes an important life decision on the basis of my assertion. On
Wednesday, I learn that he hasn’t failed it. At this point, it behooves me
to take back my Monday utterance, if I can. This sort of retraction might
not be best understood in terms of utterances of I was wrong. For this
reason, I think that the real test of retraction data (including for experi-
ments) ought to revolve around weaker phrasings such as I take that back.
In fact, I take that back is the canonical form of retraction in the most
guarded moments of MacFarlane’s book (see e.g.§1.2.2). The change
in phrasing should not affect the structure of the anti-contextualist ar-
gument: the pattern will be problematic for contextualism if there are
cases in which the speaker was entitled to assert ♦P in initial context,
but ought to retract it in the more informed context.
2.3 Epistemic Contradictions.
Yalcin (2007, 2011) develops a different kind of argument against con-
textualism. His argument takes off from the observation that P entails
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♦P but not vice-versa. If so, ¬P and ♦P should be consistent. Moreover,
if we think in terms of possible worlds, there should be a possible world
at which P is false but ♦P is true. Both predictions seem problematic: for
one thing, the conjunction ¬P & ♦P sounds bad to the point of incon-
sistency (Yalcin calls sentences that instantiate these schema epistemic
contradictions). Moreover, it is hard to understand what a world would
have to be like in order to make this conjunction true. Yalcin extends
this argument by noting that, if the badness of epistemic contradictions
was just a form of pragmatic infelicity—similar to what happens with
Moore’s paradox—it should disappear when these statements are em-
bedded under attitude verbs like suppose. But it is clear that the badness
of epistemic contradictions persists.
(9) Suppose there is a fire but I don’t believe there is one.
(10) #Suppose there is a fire but there might not be one.
Unlike (9), (10) is clearly contradictory. Because the standard pragmatic
effects involved in Moore’s paradox should be suppressed in these sup-
position environments, this observation should block the plausibility of
the pragmatic account.
Epistemic contradictions pose two problems for a theory of epistemic
modality. At the compositional level, they require the design of a seman-
tic framework that predicts why asserting (and embedding) epistemic
contradictions is bad, while also keeping the asymmetric entailment
from P to ♦P. There are various ways of accomplishing this: (Yalcin,
2007, §3) favors a style of semantics he calls domain semantics. In domain
semantics for epistemic possibility, sentences are evaluated relative to
(at least) two parameters, an information state and a world. However,
the epistemic modal ♦P is only sensitive to the information-state coordi-
nate. For instance, the domain semanticist might say that ♦P gets the
semantic value 1 relative to an information state i and a world w if and
only if some worlds in i make P true. As the point is sometimes put,
the semantic value of ♦P consists of a global constraint on i and not a
condition on which worlds are true.
While this has invited descriptions of Yalcin’s compositional semantics
as ’expressivist’, and so non-propositional, Yalcin is actually clear that
the domain semantics by itself does not settle questions about content.
In particular, there are ways of defining the content of epistemic modal
claims within domain semantics that would be friendly to a proposition-
alist. One might, for instance, suppose that the information state i is
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determined by the context of utterance. To evaluate ♦P, the semantic
engine asks the context to provide its associated state i; ♦P evaluates as
true if some worlds in i make P true, false otherwise. To complement
this view, one might attempt to extract a viable content by diagonalizing
(see Yalcin 2007, pp. 1009-1011). This complex of moves shows that it
is not impossible to accept domain semantics and be a propositionalist.
What Yalcin does argue (Yalcin 2007, pp. 1011-1012) is that, conditional
on the adoption of a domain semantics, a non-propositionalist package
is preferable to the propositionalist alternatives. This is partly because
it does a better job of capturing some intuitive inferences involving
epistemic modals.
Many other authors have developed alternative compositional accounts
of the badness of epistemic contradiction that deploy the relational
semantics framework Yalcin’s argument seeks to overturn (Dorr and
Hawthorne, 2013; Ninan, 2016; Silk, 2016a; Stojnić, forthcoming; Man-
delkern, m.s.).9 Some of these authors are resolutely neutral on questions
concerning the content of epistemic modal claims, while for others the
defense of a relational semantics is an essential first step towards a
defense of contextualism.
3 Theories of assertion and modality.
Let us set aside these content challenges. Instead, let us approach the
main question from the point of view of the theory of assertion. There
are several ways of conceptualizing the speech act of assertion. In his
survey, MacFarlane (2011b) discusses four families of accounts. The
speech act of assertion can be understood as the expression of a belief
(Bach and Harnish, 1979), as a practice regulated by constitutive norms
(Williamson, 2000), as a practice that generates distinctive commitments
(Brandom, 1994) and finally as a practice that results in distinctive
updates on context (Stalnaker, 1978). Within each of these families
we can identify many non-equivalent accounts. Normative theories
share the idea of characterizing assertion in terms of norms: one may
assert C only if some standard involving C is met. But they diverge
on the normative standard: it could be knowledge (Williamson, 2000);
9Mandelkern takes the puzzle of epistemic contradictions one step further by
drawing attention to disjunctions of epistemic contradictions (e.g. Either I might win but
I won’t or I might not win but I will). Mandelkern argues that these disjunctions—which
sound just as bad as ordinary epistemic contradiction—pose problems for virtually all
extant semantic frameworks. (Mandelkern himself advocates a sophisticated relational
semantics.)
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truth (Weiner, 2005) or reasonable belief (Lackey, 2007; Douven, 2006).
Similarly, different versions of the commitment view disagree on what
sort of commitment assertions involve.
In this section, I showcase a couple of ways in which epistemic modality
could constrain normative accounts and commitment accounts. The next
section is reserved for a more extensive discussion of context update
theories. I do not aspire to provide a complete treatment and I will set
aside belief expression theories. In any case: MacFarlane’s list was not
meant to be an exhaustive catalog of accounts of assertion—as I am sure
that this volume will demonstrate.
3.1 Normative Accounts.
My starting point is a brief but suggestive discussion by Swanson (2011,
§5). Swanson notes that the knowledge rule (in a slogan: assert only
what you know) appears to be too demanding when it comes to assertions
of epistemic possibility claims. Intuitively, many such assertions are
legitimate even if they come from a position of complete ignorance: one
needn’t know anything in particular to be in a position to assert that it
might rain.
Some will no doubt resist this challenge by insisting that asserting ♦P
does require knowledge that ♦P. They would also emphasize that this
knowledge is very weak: for contextualists, it amounts to the fact that
one has to know that the relevant information state does not rule out P.
To explain away the ‘complete ignorance’ intuition, these objectors could
note the availability of a restricted interpretation of the last sentence of
the previous paragraph. That is, they could grant that one needn’t know
any non-modal facts to be in a position to assert that it might rain.
However, a bit more can be said on behalf of Swanson’s observation. The
standard motivation for the knowledge account of assertion does not
cleanly apply to assertions of epistemic possibility claims. A critical
piece of evidence that supports the knowledge account of assertion is
that if you assert that there is chocolate in the cupboard, I can challenge
your assertion by asking How do you know? (Unger, 1975; Williamson,
2000). However, such challenges seem inappropriate when you just
make an epistemic possibility claim—a significant disanalogy with non-
modal claims.10 Another piece of evidence in support of the knowledge
10I do note that this observation fails to extend to many other modal claims in the
disputed class. Focus on the critical case of deontic modality: if I say "You should
climb that mountain", the How do you know? challenge seems much better.
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norm is that it helps explain why we cannot assert a categorical proposi-
tion only on the basis of statistical evidence (e.g., in lottery cases). There
seem to be no parallel cases in the disputed class (but see Moss 2018,
p.235 for some case that might put pressure on this). Granted, not all of
the arguments for the knowledge account fail. In particular, Moorean
sentences involving epistemic modals still sound somewhat bad.
(11) #It might rain but I don’t know that it might rain.
But perhaps it is the badness of (11) that is the odd phenomenon out.
There might an independent explanation for why (11) sounds bad, which
would allow us to stick to the line that epistemic possibility claims pose
problems for the knowledge account of assertion. To begin, I don’t know
that it might be that P is probably bad on its own. A google search for
don’t know that it might returns 0 hits (usual caveats on ‘research-by-
google-search’ apply here). A more acceptable phrasing is
(12) I don’t know whether it might be that P.
But even this is often used as a long-winded way of saying I don’t know
that P—and we already know from Moore’s paradox that there is some-
thing defective about claims of the form P and I don’t know that P. More-
over, it is (11), and not its whether-variant, that figures in the Williamso-
nian paradigm for the knowledge norm of assertion. Any argument that
the argument could run through (12) requires special assumptions about
the semantic contribution of whether. Overall, Swanson seems right that
the generalization of the standard arguments for the knowledge norm
to assertions of epistemic modals seems at best spotty.
In addition to this batch of arguments, it is important to notice that the
knowledge account is particularly hard to sustain for those contextu-
alist views of epistemic modals according to which the salient body of
information is fixed by some group’s aggregated body of evidence. In
particular, the more flexible one’s contextualism, the more demanding
the claim that one knows the content of an epistemic modal. This is
particularly puzzling for epistemic necessity claims: in the typical case,
knowing that Alex is sick seems to be sufficient for knowing that Alex
must be sick.11 However, flexible contextualists are committed to extra
11There might, of course, be restrictions on the type of knowledge. But those are
not extra pieces of knowledge that are required to the knowledge of the embedded
proposition.
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requirements beyond these ones: one has to know that the Alex’s being
sick follows from the relevant body of evidence.
A theoretical package that is friendly to the knowledge account of as-
sertion is the non-propositionalist account recently developed by Moss
(2018, m.s.). There is no hope to do justice to Moss’s sophisticated theory
in this survey (although I will say a bit more about it in §4.3). The key
point is that, for Moss, the contents of belief, assertion, and knowledge
are probabilistic (they are modeled as sets of probability spaces). So,
knowing that it might be raining is not understood as knowing that
some salient state is compatible with rain. Instead, it is understood as
an appropriate relation to a probabilistic content (the set of probabil-
ity spaces that treat rain as possible); importantly, this relation is not
mediated by a relevant body of evidence. Thus, Moss’s theory entails (i)
that knowing ♦P is an extremely weak type of knowledge and (ii) that
knowing P is sufficient to know P. Both points can be used to address
the earlier objections and overlay the knowledge account of assertion on
top of Moss’s theory of content.
The dialetic I just outlined involving the knowledge norm extends imme-
diately to normative accounts that demand less than knowledge but still
require some positive epistemic status. Consider the normative theory of
assertion according to which one must assert only what one reasonably
believes. Swanson’s point about the knowledge account applies here too.
One need not have pertinent reasonable beliefs to be licensed to assert
epistemic possibility claims.
It might look however that the truth rule (slogan: assert only what is
true, see Weiner 2005, MacFarlane 2014, §5.2) has potential to avoid
these issues. Applied to epistemic modals, the truth-rule entails that
when one asserts ♦P in context c, one’s assertion is permissible only if
♦P is true in c. This approach can be applied to epistemic modal claims,
as long as we accept that they have truth-values in context. The truth
rule avoids the previous objections, because it does not require that
permissible assertions of epistemic possibility claims be backed by any
positive epistemic status.
Even so, the previous dialectic might resurface once truth rules are
embedded within a more complex account of the normative constraints
involved in assertion. Many defenders of the truth rule often combine it
with the idea that assertions are also subject to a secondary norm.12 The
primary norm, they claim, is what constitutes the practice of assertion;
12This includes both Weiner and MacFarlane, to the extent that he is sympathetic to
the normative picture.
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the secondary norm is a general constraint on rule-governed behavior.
The idea is that whenever one is subject to a rule R, one must act so as to
know, or at least be reasonably confident that one’s behavior complies
with the rule. An analogy will help see the motivation for secondary
norms. When I do my taxes, IRS norms only cover the correctness
of my taxes. But if we are evaluating the responsibility of my tax-
compiling actions, I ought to have good reason to believe that my taxes
are correct. Out of the analogy, secondary norms are useful to the
truth-norm theorist so she can predict that lucky guesses still count
as irresponsible assertions. But, if so, we should expect assertions of
epistemic modal claims to be evaluated on the basis of both the primary
norm of assertion (truth) and the stronger combination of primary and
secondary norm. That will make our earlier concerns resurface at the
level of secondary propriety (i.e. at the level of whether the assertion
has met the secondary norm).13
3.2 Indeterminate normative statuses.
One of the morals of this discussion is that contextualists face a three-
way tradeoff between (i) holding on to the intuition that asserting ♦P
should be easy (ii) adding flexibility to the semantics and (iii) endorsing a
norm on which truth is the normative standard for assertion. It is partly
on the basis of this conflict that von Fintel & Gillies (2011) advocate
cloudy contextualism. Cloudy contextualism rejects the presumption that
there is a unique proposition that is determined from context when ♦P
is asserted. Instead, cloudy contextualists maintain that there is a set
of propositions that are expressed by an assertion of a bare epistemic
modal. An assertion of ♦P is permissible if any one of the propositions
in the "cloud" is true. In the typical context, the low-hanging fruit for
a speaker to latch onto is the solipsistic proposition (P is not ruled out
by my knowledge). Hearers however can disagree with any one of the
propositions in the cloud.
The idea that it might be indeterminate which proposition is expressed
by an epistemic modal seems attractive. But the account of assertion at
the center of von Fintel & Gillies’s proposal appears to be tailored to the
specifics of the task of providing a theory of epistemic modal assertions.
What we would want instead is a general purpose theory of assertion
13Lackey (2007) challenges the very idea of secondary propriety. For reasons I am
not be able to get into here, I am unconvinced by Lackey’s critique. However, it is
worth noting that, if Lackey is right, the truth-norm theorists are independently in
trouble. So they have to push back.
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under indeterminacy of content. Moreover, we would want such a theory
to result from combining a theory of assertion for determinate contents
(call this T) with an interface module that aggregates the verdicts of T
on each candidate proposition. The cloudy contextualist’s pragmatics
violates one plausible desideratum for how to build this interface. This
is how such a desideratum might be stated:
If (i) it is indeterminate what proposition an assertion a ex-
presses, but (ii) it is determinate that the eligible propositions
are members of the cloud C = {A1, ...,An} and (iii) the proposi-
tions in C vary with respect to the standard that is tracked by
the norms of assertion (e.g. some but not all are true), then it
is indeterminate whether a satisfies the norm of assertion.
Here is an example that does not involve modals: suppose that it is
indeterminate which of two people is my future self. Suppose also, for
the sake of illustration, that this metaphysical indeterminacy is reflected
in a content indeterminacy for assertions of my future self wears glasses.
Suppose finally that only one of my eligible future selves wears glasses.
Then, the constraint entails that the normative standing of my assertions
of that content is indeterminate.
To safeguard this constraint while keeping relatively close to von Fintel
& Gillies’ picture, one might consider a close alternative roughly in the
vein of a proposal in Cariani and Santorio (2018). The idea is simply
to supervaluate on normative statuses across the cloud. The assertion
determinately meets (/violates) the norm if for every way of resolving
the content indeterminacy, the norm is met (/violated). Consider an
assertion of ♦P associated with a cloud of propositions C and suppose
that the propositions in C vary in truth value (with truth being the norm
of assertion). Then it is indeterminate whether the speaker is in compli-
ance with the norm. The indeterminacy at the level of which proposition
is expressed is transformed into an indeterminacy at the level of the cor-
rectness of the assertion (just as required by our constraint). Under this
proposal, the status of epistemic modal assertions is short of determi-
nate compliance with the norm of assertion. At the same time, however,
these assertions are not determinate violations either. Depending on
how the conversational context resolves or constrains the indeterminacy,
our judgments about the permissibility of the assertion might fluctuate.
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3.3 Commitment Theories.
Commitment theories of assertion (in the style of Brandom 1994) share
with normative theories the idea that assertion is to be understood in
terms of the normative statuses it gives rise to. However, while normative
accounts focus on normative statuses that depend on what is upstream
from the assertion, commitment views focus on downstream normative
statuses. In particular, Brandom proposes that assertions are, in the
first place, commitments to the truth of the assertion. As MacFarlane
(2004, 2014) argues, we need to say more than this. Specifically, we
must explain what sort of action is demanded by such a commitment
and under what circumstances. At a minimum, MacFarlane says, the
commitment involves withdrawing the assertion if it is shown to be
untrue.
Swanson’s observation about the knowledge account suggests a parallel
challenge for commitment theories: assertions of ♦P signal a lack of
commitment—not the presence of one. For example, it is possible to
assert ♦P with the aim of withdrawing a previous commitment. The
invited conclusion seems to be that assertions of epistemic possibility
claims are not undertakings of a commitment. This argument breaks
down, however, for commitment theories that are based on MacFarlane’s
minimal proposal. It seems reasonable to maintain that assertions of
epistemic modal claims do, indeed, indicate a commitment to withdraw
the assertion if its content is shown to be untrue. That might not register
as a substantive commitment when we compare it to the much stronger
commitment to the truth of P but it is a commitment nonetheless. More-
over, adopting that commitment might have the effect of suspending
some other prior committments.
That said, proponents of commitment views must tread carefully if
they go beyond MacFarlane’s minimal commitment. This is because the
dialectic surrounding Swanson’s observation might resurface again if the
speaker’s commitment involves the requirement to justify her assertion
should she be challenged (as Swanson 2011, p.262 notes). This is, again,
proof that thinking about epistemic modality—and indeed thinking
about the statements in the disputed class—can help constrain the range
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of viable views of assertion.
4 Context update theories.
Let us circle back to views according to which the speech act of assertion
is distinctively associated with an effect on context. For Stalnaker, an
assertion is a proposal to add a proposition to the common ground.
As we have already seen, this view entails that assertions of epistemic
modal claims, if there are any, must eliminate possibilities that are
compatible with the common ground. This is fine for propositionalists
but problematic for those who think that utterances of epistemic modals
do not subtract from the range of possibilities that are compatible with
the common ground.14 In this final section, I want to review three
strategies available to the non-propositionalist for dealing with this
situation. The first denies that sentences in the disputed class can be
vehicles of assertion (§4.1). The second approach accepts that they
can sometimes be asserted, but goes in for an account of assertion in
which not all assertions update the context in the same way (§4.2). The
final approach (§4.3) accepts that epistemic modals can sometimes be
asserted and also that assertions are always eliminative but achieves this
by adopting a non-standard theory of content.
Ahead of these developments, I will note that the choice between these
options (especially between the first and the second) is at least in part a
terminological one. I will not attempt to disentangle which bits of the
argument are terminological in nature—or even whether it matters that
they are terminological as opposed to substantive—but the issue will be
evident in a couple places.
4.1 Assertion barriers.
Perhaps, unembedded epistemic modals sentences fail to be eligible
vehicles of assertions. Call this the assertion barrier view. One very
strong way of making this thought more precise is as the claim that no
assertion can ever be performed by uttering ♦P (and similarly with the
other disputed sentences). A weaker assertion barrier view might claim
that ♦P has two uses: one in which it serves to eliminate possibilities
and one in which it does not.
14Indeed, MacFarlane (2011b) uses the discourse effects of epistemic modals as an
objection to Stalnaker’s account of assertion.
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Yalcin (2007) hints at an assertion-barrier thesis. Here is a passage that
implies a distinction between "saying ♦ϕ" and assertions.
To say ♦ϕ is not to propose to add some informational con-
tent, some proposition, to the common ground, as with as-
sertions. Rather, it is to make explicit that ϕ-possibilities are
compatible with the common ground (Yalcin, 2007, p.1010)
Yalcin’s full picture is a bit more complex than this passage suggests.
Yalcin (2018) distinguishes between illocutionary force and dynamic
force. In particular, Yalcin suggests that there are two ways of thinking
about assertion that are not equivalent, but nonetheless not in competi-
tion as the "correct account of assertion". On the one hand, we can think
of assertion as a speech act that is associated with uttering declarative
sentences (in the right conditions—whatever those might be); on the
other, as a type of act that is associated with a distinctive update on
the score of a conversation. The natural interpretation of the passage I
quoted is that "sayings" of ♦ϕ are not assertions in the "dynamic force"
sense, but that leaves it open that might be assertions in some other
sense.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Stalnaker himself develops an assertion-barrier
proposal (Stalnaker, 2016, ch. 6). Stalnaker argues that we ought to
distinguish a few different ways of updating a context. In addition to the
standard assertive update—an intervention on the context prior to the
assertion—we could have prospective updates. The effect of some claims
is to propose that we move to a new context in a way that is constrained
by the truth-conditions of what is being claimed. For instance, saying
♦P can be construed as a proposal to move to a posterior context in
which P is compatible with the common ground. Stalnaker models his
account of epistemic modal claims on his interpretation of the language
game in Lewis’s "A Problem about Permission" (Lewis, 1975). Much
like epistemic modal claims can expand the possibilities under consid-
eration, permission claims can have the effect of expanding the range
of permissible actions for salient agents (Lewis calls these spheres of
permissibility). For example, when I say to my daughter you may have
one square of chocolate I say something that has certain truth-conditions.
Perhaps, it is true in context c if and only if my daugher’s sphere of
permissibility in c includes some possibilities in which she eats one
square of chocolate. But, Stalnaker suggests, the typical point of making
this claim in a context c− is not to add the proposition associated with
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those truth-conditions to the common ground. It is instead to transition
to a new context c+ in which those truth-conditions are satisfied.
There are some important difficulties for the assertion barrier view.
Swanson (2011, §5) argues—persuasively in my view—that simple ver-
sions of the assertion barrier view cannot work, because they do not
make sense of seemingly assertive utterances of mixed claims. Consider,
for instance:
(13) There might be chocolate and there is wine.
Is (13) a possible vehicle of assertion? Prior to any argument, we might
entertain three possibilities:
option 1: all of (13) is asserted.
option 2: no part of (13) is asserted.
option 3: the second but not the first conjunct of (13) is asserted.
The first option is not compatible with the assertion barrier view: surely
if you can assert a conjunction of the form ♦P & __, then you can assert
the unembedded ♦P. The second option makes a mystery of what should
be an obvious fact: it is possible, maybe even typical, to utter (13), and
have the content of the second conjunct be treated as asserted content.
(We update the common ground with its content, and we hold speakers
responsible for it in whatever relevant ways.) The third option either
does not make sense or, at the very least, requires quite the revolution in
the theory of speech acts (to allow us to categorize an utterance of s as a
a complex act consisting of a non-assertion followed by an assertion).
Dever (ms.) also notes that the assertion barrier view obscures the fact
that epistemic modal sentences can be part of ordinary information
exchanges. When I say to you Jonathan will probably come, I am calling
for you to revise your information state (if it currently lacks the rele-
vant structure). Although we might, once again, be in terminological
dispute territory, Dever is pointing that it is intuitive to group together
under the label "assertion" all attempts to affect the information states
of conversational participants.
4.2 Variable effect theories.
Another possible reaction is that Stalnaker’s truism goes wrong because
it presupposes that the category of assertion is unified by the particular
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type of update it is associated with. Maybe we should instead adopt
a picture on which assertions are associated with a variety of possible
effects.
This response is particularly natural if we think from the perspective
of update semantics (Veltman, 1996). The driving slogan of update se-
mantics (and of dynamic semantics more generally) is that meanings are
context-change potentials and not contributions to truth-conditions. For
our purposes, however, the interesting feature of these systems is that
context-change potential is not a uniform notion. Not every declarative
sentence updates the context in the same way. Instead, the updates cor-
responding to various sentences, even in a simple propositional modal
langauge, are defined by distinguishing a variety of possible cases.
Suppose that we only think of context as a set of possibilities i. Let us
use the notation i[P] to denote the update of state i with the information
associated with sentence P. Here is the standard update semantics for a
propositional modal language (this is Veltman’s system with a standard
tweak on conjunction due to Heim 1983):
If P is atomic, i[P] = i ∩ P.
i[¬P] = i − i[P]
i[P & Q] = i[P][Q]
i[♦P] = i, if i ∩ P , ∅, else i[♦P] = ∅.
Atomic sentences perform the standard eliminative update. In fact, the
full system guarantees that updates with any Boolean combination of
atomic sentences is intersective. The update corresponding to ♦P is what
Veltman calls a test on the state (in this case, since we are momentarily
identifying states and contexts, it is a test on the context).
One potential problem with Veltman’s original approach is that it does
not seem to have any model for the natural thought that epistemic
possibility claims can add to the set of possibilities we treat as live, or
take seriously. Many theorists have found it attractive to think of some
epistemic modal utterances as doing just that (von Fintel and Gillies
2007 §5, MacFarlane 2011b, Willer 2013, Lennertz 2014). Instead, on
the test conception, ♦P either returns the initial state or crashes the state
into the contradictory state.
A particularly nice model of this phenomenon is developed by Willer
(2013). Willer’s key idea is to view the standard update model as part of
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a two-step theory of update. Instead of thinking of the informational
component of context as a single set of possibilities, Willer proposes
thinking of it as a set of sets of possibilities. Setting aside the general
formal representation, Willer’s central idea can be illustrated with an
example. Suppose that the only relevant event is a past flip of a coin.
The conversational record is completely silent about this flip— nothing
has been said about the coin. There are three (qualitative) information
states we might be in with respect to this subject matter: certain of heads
(H), uncertain (U), and certain of tails (T). (Each of these is modeled as a
set of possibilities.) A context that has no commitment whatsoever could
be represented as the set of all such states: {H, U, T}. (Note that we now
have a distinction between context and states.) A possibility is live in a
context c if it is compatible with every state in c. It is compatible with c
if it is compatible with some state in c. In our example, the possibility
of tails is not live in the initial context (even if it is compatible with
it) because there is a state that excludes it. The effect of asserting any
sentence in a context is to update each state in the context (this is where
the standard dynamic theory gets used). If a state in c gets updated
to contradiction, it is eliminated from the context. So, asserting the
coin might land tails in the context represented by {H, U, T} has the
effect of eliminating H (because the Veltman-style test on this state with
that sentence crashes) and returning {U, T}. In the new state the coin’s
landing tails is a live possibility.
One interesting feature of the non-uniform approach is that it is easy
to write new entries for different types of expressions. There are well-
developed proposals for adding counterfactuals (Veltman, 2005), proba-
bility operators (Yalcin, 2012), and deontic modals (Cariani, 2016; Silk,
2016b; Starr, 2016; Willer, 2016) to the update semantics framework.
These dynamic approaches embody the idea that there are many ways
of updating a context. But does this fact show that there are many
possible effects for assertions? Well, it does not follow, for sure. But there
certainly is an attractive way to think about this. Following a lead by
Dever (ms.), we can say that every assertion is associated with an update,
but not every assertion updates the context in the same way. Non-modal
sentences update the context in the familiar, eliminative ways. Epistemic
modal claims have their own distinctive way of updating the context.
Deontic claims might have yet another.
This move is not available to all non-propositionalists. In section §1, I
noted a fault-line among non-propositional views. Some demand that
the disputed sentences, e.g. ♦P, have no propositional uses. Others
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suggest that sometimes these sentences can be used non-propositionally.
The update semantics approaches I have discussed in this section (along
with my overlays about assertion) seem only compatible with the first
approach. Perhaps, however, the same move can be replicated by the
dynamic pragmatist in the style of Stalnaker’s (2016) view that I described
in the last section.
It is natural to worry that a big question looms for this view: what is
the more general conception of assertion? What unifies an assertion of
P, with an assertion of ♦P? Here it is easy to take a few wrong turns.
We might start by identifying assertions with updates on context. The
immediate difficulty is that, when we start modeling a broader fragment
of language, there will be different updates that have nothing to do with
assertion (e.g. questions, commands). A preliminary proposal to fix
this problem is by Dever (ms.), who suggests that we might think of
assertions as updates on the informational coordinate of context. So, we
might classify commands as non-assertions because they intervene on
an agent’s sphere of permissibity. One problem with this proposal is
that some of our motivation for classifying utterances of the disputed
modal sentences as assertions extends to deontic claims. The problem
is that we might want to give a semantics for these claims that does
not only involve updates on the informational coordinate of context.
Additionally, there is a converse problem: there are speech acts that
are not assertions but nonetheless affect the informational coordinate
of context: one of the key points in (Stalnaker, 1978, p. 87) is that we
cannot identify assertion with eliminative update because suppositions
have the same effect on context as assertions.
While I do not quite see how to come up with a general characterization
of assertion in terms of update, I am not sure that such a characterization
is necessary. Without going all in for quietism, it seems reasonable to
hope that a serviceable, if not completely correct, characterization might
come from the theory of illocutionary forces. And even if that project
failed, it is not clear what indispensable philosophical value would be
provided to the theory of meaning from having such a characterization.
4.3 Uniform effect, complex contents.
According to the last option I want to consider, assertions of non-modal
sentences and assertions of epistemic sentences all have the same kind
of content, but not propositional content. Moss (2018) proposes that
epistemic claims generally be understood as denoting sets of probability
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spaces. A probability space is a triple 〈W,S,P 〉 in which W is a set of
worlds, S is a set of subsets of W , and P is a probability function defined
over S.
To a first approximation, we might say: the content of it is .6 likely that
there is chocolate is the set of probability spaces that assign .6 to the
proposition that there is chocolate (in the relevant place). The content of
there might be chocolate is the set of probability spaces that are compatible
with the proposition that there is chocolate.15 Crucially, Moss proposes
that non-modal sentences also have probabilistic contents: the content
of there is chocolate is the set of probability spaces that are certain that
there is chocolate.16
This picture invites a natural lifting of the standard Stalnakerian story
about the effects of assertion. First, treat the common ground of a
conversation as determining a set of probability spaces (Rothschild 2012,
Yalcin 2012, Swanson 2016, Moss 2018, §2.3). Next, because of the unity
in content, treat update as the addition of a constraint to the probabilistic
common ground.
One possible shortcoming of this approach is that, as presently con-
structed, it singles out for special treatment the fragment of the disputed
class that involves epistemic language. For instance, there is no parallel
provision for deontic statements. Because the story thrives on its abil-
ity to treat non-modal and modal information uniformly, it is also not
possible to adopt the piece-meal approach we followed in the case of
update semantics. There are, I think, three options for development in
this direction. First, we could claim that some or all of the non-epistemic
statements in the disputed class are analyzed along contextualist lines.
The problem is that much of the motivation for rejecting propositional-
ism carries over at least to the deontic case (for a non-exhaustive sample,
see Ninan 2005; MacFarlane 2014, ch. 11; Charlow 2016; Starr 2016). At
the opposite end of the spectrum, someone who is in broad agreement
with Moss’s framework might appeal to a more general object than sets
of probability spaces. In addition to the technical task of figuring out
what objects might work, this strategy would also compromise some of
the elegance of the framework. The intermediate course would be to try
to tell a story on which the contents of deontic modal claims are also
sets of probability spaces.
15Compatibility is spelled out in a way that is subtle and involves a touch of context-
dependence via partitions. See the semantic proposal in the appendix to Moss’s book
and in Moss (2015) .
16This hypothesis is combined with an explanation for why we don’t often take
ourselves to assert such extreme contents when we assert non-modal sentences.
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It is not hard to see how one might get started on this project (but
it is hard to tell how much danger lies ahead). Deontic modals are
already arguably sensitive to probabilistic information (Cariani, 2016).
So, consider a context in which various bets are being placed on a coin
flip and the odds of the bet are known to be even and the addressee cares
about winning. In such a context,
(14) You should bet that the coin will land heads.
denotes the set of probability spaces that assigns more than .5 to the
proposition that the coin will land heads. If we were in a context in
which the addressee intended to lose, the same sentence might instead
denote the set of probability spaces that assigns less than .5 to that same
proposition. (Moss’s framework is designed to be able to lift and exploit
very standard ideas about context sensitivity.) If this approach could
be generalized for all the deontic claims in the disputed class, it would
preserve the unity and explanatory power of the framework.
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